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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
3. The material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, or ar-
tistic, or political, or scientific value. 43
If you do find the defendant guilty (under Count-) of that
offense, you will fix his punishment:
1. By imprisonment in the county jail for a term fixed by you,
but not more than 1 year, or
2. By a fine to be fixed by you, but not less than $50 nor more
than $1,000, or
3. By both such fine and imprisonment.
NOTES ON USE
1. If the defendant raises the issue that the material falls under one
of the protected categories listed in § 563.280, RSMo 1969, the jury in-
struction should be modified as follows to properly submit the issue to
the jury:
Third, that the material was not (in a public standard medical
textbook) (in a report of a medical society) (used in practice by a




REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS-
STANDING UNDER SECTION 14(e)
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.'
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. (Chris-Graft) attempted to gain control
of Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper) by means of a cash tender offer,
i.e., a public offer to purchase shares from Piper shareholders at a pre-
mium above the market price. As is customary in such cases, the Piper
management took measures to prevent the takeover.2 Piper sent a letter
43. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
1. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
2. The target corporation management has a strong incentive to oppose
such tender offers because a takeover normally is followed by a change in man-
agement. For a discussion of the mechanics of tender offers and possible man-
euvers to thwart them, see Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45
HARV. Bus. REv. 135 (1967).
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RECENT CASES
to its shareholders describing Chris-Craft's offer as "inadequate and not
in the best interests of Piper's shareholders." Piper also enlisted the aid
of Grumman Aircraft Corporation and later Bangor Punta Corporation
to make competing tender offers.3 Grumman withdrew from the com-
petition, but Bangor Punta did make an offer of cash and securities to
Piper shareholders and eventually achieved control of Piper.4
Chris-Craft, the defeated offeror, brought an action under section
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,5 alleging that the Piper
management had made misrepresentations in its descriptions of both the
Chris-Craft offer and the proposed Grumman offer. Chris-Craft also
claimed that Bangor Punta misrepresented the value of securities it of-
fered in exchange for Piper shares in violation of section 14(e), and that
Bangor Punta made private purchases during the pendency of its own
tender offer in violation of rule lOb-6 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
6
3. 430 U.S. at 5-7.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Section 14(e) was amended to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by
the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 3, 82 Stat. 457 (1968) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970)):
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connec-
tion with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any
such offer, request, or invitation.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977) provides in pertinent part:(a) It shall constitute a 'manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance' as used in section 10 (b) of the act for any person,
(1) Who is an underwriter or prospective underwriter in a particu-
lar distribution of securities, or
(2) Who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a dis-
tribution is being made, or
(3) Who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to par-
ticipate or is participating in such a distribution, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national se-
curities exchange, either alone or with one or more other persons,
to bid for or purchase for any account in which he has a beneficial
interest, any security which is the subject of such distribution, or any
security of. the same class and series, or any right to purchase any
such security, or to attempt to induce any person to purchase any
such security or right, until after he has completed his participation
in such distribution ....
Rule 10b-6 was promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) which pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... [to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
1978]
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The Second Circuit held that the defeated offeror had standing to
bring a private action for damages for the violation of section 14(e). 7
Chris-Craft was eventually awarded compensatory damages of more than
$25 million for tie loss of the opportunity to control Piper.8 The Sec-
ond Circuit also held that for a period of five years Bangor Punta be
enjoined from voting the Piper shares it obtained in violation of rule
10b-6.9 The Supreme Court reversed and held that a disappointed ten-
der offeror has no implied right of action for damages under section
14(e).' 0 The Court also held that the injunction should not have been
granted because it was premised on the lower court's impermissible
award of damages under section 14(e) and rule lOb-6.1 The Court left
open the question whether a private action for an injunction would lie
under section 14(e). Such an action may be a remedy available to tender
offerors to combat improper conduct by the management of the target
corporation and competing tender offerors.12
The Court in Piper agreed with earlier lower court decisions that the
purpose of section 14(e) is to protect the target corporation shareholder
7. Chris-Craft Ind., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
8. Chris-Craft Ind., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1975). For a discussion of the method of ascertaining damages, see Comment,
Remedies for Defrauded Tender Offerors under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 62 GEo. L.J. 1693 (1974).
9. Chris-Craft Ind., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
10. 430 U.S. at 42. The Court also held that Chris-Craft lacked standing to
recover damages for alleged violations of rule 1Ob-6 by Bangor Punta because
Chris-Craft based its daim on the loss of the opportunity to control Piper. Rule
10b-6, the Court said, was designed to provide a remedy to persons injured be-
cause the price at which they bought or sold securities was influenced by the
manipulative practices of a tender offeror. This decision may be part of a recent
trend to'restrict access to the federal courts, particularly in the securities regula-
tion area. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (a private
right of action for damages will not lie under rule lOb-5 in the absence of an
allegation of scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (restricted private damage actions under rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers
and sellers). See Triplett, Securities Regulation-Rule lOb-5--Scienter Required for
Private Actions, 42 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1977). See generally McDonald, Has the Supreme
Court Abandoned the Constitution?, SATURDAY REvIEW, May 28, 1977, at 10. For a
discussion of standing in general, see Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. Rnv. 645 (1973); Sedler, Standing Justiciability, and
All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1972).
11. 430 U.S. at 47.
12. For a general discussion of tender offers and their importance in the
acquisition of corporate control, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL (1973); Hayes & Taussig, supra note 2; Mundheim, Tender
Offers, 2 REv. SEC. REG. 953 (1969). For a discussion of the statutory law in this
area, see Maylay, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws,
43 GEo. WASH. L. RFv. 551 (1975).
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RECENT CASES
who must decide whether to sell or keep his shares in the face of a
tender offer.'3 However, the Court broke with the earlier cases by re-
fusing to recognize a private right of action in the defeated offeror, find-
ing that such private actions were not necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose of section 14(e).1 4
Without the benefit of previous Supreme Court decisions on a pri-
vate right of action under section 14(e), the Court reasoned from other
cases in the securities regulation area in order to decide Piper. The sem-
inal case on the implied right to sue under a securities regulation statute
isJ.L Case Co. v. Borak.15 In that case the Court found an implied pri-
vate right of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,16 even though that statute, like section 14(e), does not expressly
provide for a private right of action. A shareholder brought suit alleging
that he had been deprived of his pre-emptive rights through a merger
accomplished by means of a false and misleading proxy statement. Rec-
ognizing that the SEC could not investigate the 2,000 proxy statements
filed each year, the Court in Borak stated: "We, therefore, believe that
under the circumstances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congres-
sional purpose." 17 In Piper the Court recognized this policy as stated in
Borak 18 but did not find it controlling.
To determine whether the recognition of an implied private right of
action for damages was necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose
behind section 14(e), the Court in Piper applied the four standards it had
developed in Cort v. Ash: 19 1) whether the plaintiff was one for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted; 2) whether there was an intent
13. 430 U.S. at 34; H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424
(1st Cir. 1973).
14. 430 U.S. at 45-46. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d
421 (lst Cir. 1973), affg, 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972); Butler Aviation Int'l,
Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970). In Applied
Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), Judge Weinfeld displayed a greater talent for irony than for
prophesy in a decision handed down less than two months before the decision inPiper: It is too late in the day, however, to argue that an offeror-or
for that matter, a target corporation-does not have standing in the
constitutional sense to assert violations of section 14 [part of the Wil-
liams Act] by its adversary in the contest for corporate control ...
It is clear that an offeror has standing to seek relief for acts of a
target company's management that violate section 14 and threaten
direct economic injury to the offeror. (footnotes omitted)
15. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). This section deals with the solicitation of prox-
ies in contravention of SEC rules and regulations.
17. 377 U.S. at 433.
18. 430 U.S. at 25.
19. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1978]
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on the part of the legislature to create or deny a private remedy;
3) whether the implication of a private remedy would be consistent with
the underlying legislative scheme; and 4) whether the cause of action
was one normally relegated to state law. 20 The Court in Piper examined
these factors and concluded that the recognition of an implied private
action for damages under section 14(e) was not necessary to effectuate
the intent of Congress.2 1
The reliance placed by the Court in Piper on the Ash factors war-
rants a detailed look at Cort v. Ash. That case involved a shareholder's
derivative action to recover damages for the corporation from its direc-
tors who had made allegedly illegal contributions to a presidential cam-
paign.22 The shareholder also sought to enjoin the corporation from
making future illegal contributions. The Court held that the shareholder
did not have standing to bring the suit. The differences between the
election statute in Ash 23 and section 14(e) in Piper make the validity of
the Court's analogy questionable. The reasoning in Ash should not be
extended to preclude tender offerors from maintaining a suit under sec-
tion 14(e) for an injunction either against a competing offeror or against
the management of the target corporation. It is enlightening to examine
how the Court in Ash interpreted the factors relied upon in Piper.
The first factor was whether the plaintiff is one for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted. The purpose of the statute in Ash was to
prevent corporations from using their aggregated wealth to corrupt the
federal election process. The Court in Ash stated that the election statute
did not directly concern the internal relationship between corporations
and their shareholders; therefore, a private right of action did not exist.
In Ash the Court itself contrasted that statute with the securities
regulation area where a pervasive federal scheme does govern the rela-
tionship between plaintiffs and defendants. The Court cited J.I. Case v.
Borak as an example of a case in which such a statutory scheme govern-
ing the relationship between a corporation and its shareholders was
found to exist and in which a private right of action was implied under
section 14(a). An equally strong argument can be made that section 14(e)
governs the relationship between tender offerors, the management of
the target corporation, and the corporation's shareholders, thereby satis-
fying the first Ash factor.
The second consideration was whether there was an indication of
legislative intent either to create or to preclude a private remedy. When
the Congress enacted section 14(e) in 1968, it did not enter unmarked
legislative territory as it did in enacting the election campaign reform
20. 430 U.S. at 37-41.
21. Id. at 42.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
23. 422 U.S. at 74-75.
(Vol. 43
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statute. Private causes of action already had been found to lie in the
securities area under section 14(a) 24 and rule 1Ob- 5 2 5 even though there
was no express grant of such right in either of those provisions. There
was no indication by Congress that a similar private cause of action
should not be implied under section 14(e). The Court in Ash recognized
that in situations in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class
of persons certain rights, "it is not necessary to show an intention to
create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such
cause of action would be controlling." 2 6 The Court in Ash stated that,
without a prior history of private rights of action in the election area, the
election statute gave no indication that Congress intended to give
shareholders broader rights than those provided by state corporation
laws.
The third factor was whether it would be consistent with the under-
lying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a private remedy.
The Court in Ash pointed out that the recovery of damages in that case
would not cure the influence exerted on the election by the illegal con-
tribution. Again the Court contrasted this situation with that in J.L Case
v. Borak where it was held that a private right of action could deter the
undesirable manipulation of the securities market.2 7  In addition, in-
junctive relief was denied to the plaintiff in Ash because of a statutory
provision expressly vesting primary jurisdiction in the Federal Election
Commission over alleged violations of the Act.2 8 Any person who be-
lieved a violation had occurred was required to make a complaint to the
Commission rather than resort to the courts in the first instance.2 9 In
Piper the Court freely adopted the reasoning in Ash without addressing
this important distinction between the two cases.
The practical aspects of regulating federal election campaigns are in
sharp contrast to the problems of regulating the continuous series of
transactions covered by section 14(e). Compared to the context of a fed-
eral election campaign, the number of potential plaintiffs in the tender
offer situation is relatively small. The plaintiff in the tender offer situa-
tion is also more likely to have a direct interest in the outcome of the
litigation. The involvement of private plaintiffs in the tender offer situa-
tion is not as burdensome as in the context of a federal election cam-
paign in that the result of the delay and uncertainty of litigation would
24. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185(1976) (a private cause of action for damages will not lie under rule lOb-5 absent
an allegation of scienter); Triplett, supra note 9.
26. 422 U.S. at 82.
27. Id. at 84.
28. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b) (Supp. V 1975).
29. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (A) (Supp. V 1975).
1978]
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not be nearly as serious in a tender offer as it might be in a presidential
election. For these reasons, the argument in favor of ready access to the
courts is stronger in the tender offer situation than in the context of a
federal election campaign.
The fourth factor was whether the cause of action was one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law. The misuse of corporate funds in Ash has
been primarily a matter for state law. The Court in Ash contrasted this to
securities regulation which is an area into which federal law has made
substantial incursions. Again, the Court in Ash cited J.I. Case v. Borak as
an example of a case in which a private right of action under a federal
securities statute was implied because the Court believed the intrusion of
state law would impede the congressional intent to regulate proxy state-
ments.30
In addition to the distinctions which can be drawn between Ash and
Piper, there are practical considerations which weigh in favor of recog-
nizing the standing of a tender offeror to enjoin violations of section
14(e). The legislative history is clear and the Court in Piper recognized
that the purpose of the Act is to protect the shareholders of a target
corporation and not to provide its management with a means of dis-
couraging take-over bids.3 1 Unless tender offerors have some means to
prevent violations by the incumbent management, i.e., through a private
injunction remedy under section 14(e), this balance will be destroyed and
the management will have gained an advantage.
More importantly, a private injunctive remedy is necessary to pro-
tect the shareholder of the target corporation. It may be unrealistic to
expect a shareholder of a target corporation to bring an action against
the management of that corporation. Shareholders are generally una-
ware of the background information necessary to judge the truth or fal-
sity of statements made either by management or by one of the compet-
ing offerors.32 A tender offeror also will have a greater economic stake
in the outcome of the contest than an individual shareholder and, there-
30. 422 U.S. at 85.
31. 430 U.S. at 28-31; H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CONG. CODE & ADM. NEws 2811, 2813:
The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor
of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid.
It is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
investors while at the same time providing the offeror and man-
agement equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975), the Court stated:
"The Congress expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for man-
agement to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock
which would create the potential for such attempts."
32. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972). This case deals with the standing of a target corporation under
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fore, a greater incentive to detect violations and vigorously 1ursue rem-
edies.3 3 In addition, the SEC probably does not have the same day-to-
day familiarity with the facts possessed by an adversary in the struggle; a
familiarity necessary to appraise the accuracy of the statements required
by section 13(d). 34 The problem becomes even more acute when the
management enlists another company, as Piper enlisted Bangor Punta
and Grumman to make a competing tender offer. The new offeror
normally will agree to retain the incumbent management in return for
that management's help in the tender offer contest. Management will
want the new offeror to win, and therefore will have no incentive to
police the statements of this offeror.
Unless the offeror can obtain equitable relief, the shareholders of
the target corporation may be limited in effect to the information their
management wishes them to receive.35 The offeror will be unable to
compel the management to correct misrepresentations or to enjoin man-
ipulative acts or false statements of a competing tender offeror who is
supported by the management. If the tender offeror does not have
standing under section 14(e), he will be forced to seek an injunction in a
state court applying state law with all the hurdles such a course might
involve, e.g., security deposits, venue and jurisdiction problems, lack of
experience of state judges in dealing with such cases, and the lack of
state law to cover securities regulation problems. If a state happened to
attach no liability to the behavior sought to be enjoined, the purpose of
section 14(e) might be frustrated.36
There are also policy reasons favoring the development of a less
restrictive test for standing to obtain an injunction than for standing to
seek damages. If an injunction can be obtained while the illegal activities
are in progress, or before they begin, the public interest in having the
outcome of tender offers determined by well-informed shareholders is
more likely to be vindicated. If a large number of shareholders is in-
volved, it will be easier and more economical to grant injunctive relief
than to attempt full redress by awarding damages to those shareholders.
Fraud and other illegal practices are more likely to be prevented and not
merely redressed. There would be no chance the plaintiff recovering
damages he might not deserve and which might not of benefit the per-
sons injured by the illegal acts. 37
33. H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1973).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
35. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910
(N.D. Tex. 1976). The Court granted an injunction under § 14(e) compelling the
management to provide a shareholder list to a tender offeror. This was done to
enable the offeror to correct the misrepresentations made by the management
concerning the tender offer.
36. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964).
37. Binder, The Securities Law of Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569, 580
(1973). Binder develops these factors in an argument advocating the relaxation
1978]
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The majority in Piper indicated that the question of standing to seek
an injunction under section 14(e) was not decided. 38  The Court con-
cluded that "Chris-Craft, as a defeated tender offeror [had] no implied
cause of action for damages under section 14(e)." 39 In response to Mr.
Justice Stevens' dissent that Congress would not have intended to
"exclude the persons most interested in effective enforcement from the
class authorized to enforce the new law, ' 40 the Court stated that the
holding was a limited one and that Justice Stevens' argument was "sim-
ply unwarranted." 4' Indeed, the Court reserved for another day the
question whether a suit in equity for injunctive relief, as distinguished
from an action for damages, would lie in favor of a tender offeror
under either section 14(e) or rule 10b-6.42 When that day arrives, there
are strong arguments to be made in favor of a finding that a tender
offeror does have standing to seek an injunction under section 14(e).
ROBERTJ. MILLS
of the buyer/seller rule for standing to obtain an injunction under rule 10b-5. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). This rule was developed in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
38. 430 U.S. at 42 n.28. The Court did reverse the injunction granted by the
circuit court under rule lOb-&. This injunction was granted to prevent Bangor
Punta from voting its illegally obtained shares and thus to deprive Bangor Punta
of the benefit of its violations. In contrast, an injunction under § 14(e) could be
sought to enjoin illegal acts such as those allegedly engaged in by Piper and
Bangor Punta.
39. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Once one recognizes that Congress
intended to rely heavily on private litigation as a method of implementing the
statute, it seems equally clear that Congress would not exclude the persons most
interested in effective enforcement from the class authorized to enforce the new
law." Justice Stevens also observed that "[w~hen no effective judicial remedy is
available, self-help is more attractive." Id. at 68.
41. Id. at 42 n.28.
42. Id. at 47 n.33.
[Vol. 43
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